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COMMENTS
JURISDICTION OF THE FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION
UNDER THE NATURAL GAS ACT -COMMINGLED GAS
A new era in which the Federal Power Commission' is
threatening to increase federal regulation through novel inter-
pretations of its jurisdictional grant ironically was marked
by the United States Supreme Court reversal of an FPC decli-
nation of jurisdiction 2 in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin
(1954).3 The Natural Gas Act of 19384 was enacted to close a
gap created by decisions precluding state regulation of rates
of electricity and natural gas that traversed state lines. 5 Among
1. The Federal Power Commission was created in 1920 by the Federal Water
Power Act, 41 Stat. 1063-77 (1920), principally for the promotion of interstate
navigation. See Alabama Power Co. v. Gulf Power Co., 283 Fed. 606 (D. Ala.
1922). In 1930 the FPC was reorganized into an independent agency. 46 Stat.
797 (1930). In 1935 the Federal Water Power Act became the Federal Power
Act, 49 Stat. 863, which entrusted the FPC with regulation and development of
water power and resources, interstate transmission, and sales for resale of electric
energy. 42 FPC ANN. REP. 6 (1962).
The Commission presently exists under 41 Stat. 1063 (1920), as amended, 16
U.S.C. § 792 (1958), as amended, 16 U.S.C. § 792 (Supp. IV, 1958). The Nat-
ural Gas Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 821 (1938), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 717-717w
(1958), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 717c (Supp. IV, 1958), extended the Commis-
sion's jurisdiction to regulation of interstate operations of natural gas companies
similar to that provided in the Federal Power Act for electric utilities. 42 FPC
ANN. REP. 6 (1962). Certain functions with respect to facilities located on
United States borders were designated by Exec. Order No. 10485, 18 Fed. Reg.
5397 (1953).
2. The Federal Power Commission held Phillips was not a "natural-gas com-
pany" within the meaning of the Natural Gas Act, therefore not within the Com-
mission's jurisdiction. 10 F.P.C. 246 (1951).
3. 347 U.S. 672 (1954).
4. 52 Stat. 821 (1938), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 717-717w (1958), as amend-
ed, 15 U.S.C. §§ 717-717w (Supp. IV, 1958).
5. Two United States Supreme Court decisions created the gap that rendered
states powerless to regulate rates of natural gas and electricity, while the federal
government was lacking congressional authorization and regulatory machinery:
Missouri v. Kansas Gas Co., 265 U.S. 298 (1924), holding an interstate pipeline's
wholesale sale of gas produced in another state in interstate commerce, even
though mixed with gas produced in state of sale; and Public Utilities Commis-
sion v. Attleboro Steam & Electric Co., 273 U.S. 83 (1927), holding a sale in
generating state of energy transmitted to and consumed in another state in inter-
state commerce. State rate regulation of these interstate products was considered
a forbidden burden on business essentially national in character. Id. at 90 (con-
trolled by the Missouri case) ; Missouri v. Kansas Gas Co., supra at 307, relying
on Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U.S. 352, 396 (1913) : "'If a state enactment
imposes a direct burden upon interstate commerce, it must fall regardless of Fed-
eral legislation. The point of such an objection is not that Congress has acted,
but that the State has directly restrained that which in the absence of Federal
[600]
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other things the FPC has authority over "the sale in interstate
commerce of natural gas for resale."6
"'Interstate commerce' means commerce between any
regulation should be free.' The question is so fully discussed in that case, that
nothing beyond its citation is required."
Recognition of the existence of this gap and the need for remedial legislation
was expressed in H.R. REP. No. 709, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1937) : "The States
have, of course, for many years regulated sales of natural gas to consumers in
intrastate transactions. The States have also been able to regulate sales to con-
sumers even though such sales are in interstate commerce, such sales being con-
sidered local in character and in the absence of Congressional prohibition subject
to state regulation . . . .There is no intention in enacting the present legislation
to disturb the States in their exercise of such jurisdiction. However, in the case
of sales for resale, or so-called wholesale sales, in interstate commerce (for ex-
ample, sales by producing companies to distributing companies) the legal situa-
tion is different. Such transactions have been considered to be not local in char-
acter and, even in the absence of Congressional action, not subject to State regu-
lation. (See Missouri v. Kansas Gas Co. (1924), 265 U.S. 298, and Public Ser-
vice Commission v. Attleboro Steam and Electric Co. (1927), 273 U.S. 83.) The
basic purpose of the present legislation is to occupy this field in which the Su-
preme Court has held that the States may not act."
6. 52 Stat. 821 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 717(b) (1958): "The provisions of this
chapter shall apply to the transportation of natural gas in interstate commerce,
to the sale in interstate commerce of natural gas for resale for ultimate public
consumption for domestic, commercial, industrial, or any other use, and to natural-
gas companies engaged in such transportation or sale, but shall not apply to any
other transportation or sale of natural gas or to the local distribution of natural
gas or to the facilities used for such distribution or to the production or gathering
of natural gas." Note that "in interstate commerce" follows both "transportation
of natural gas" and "sale" in the provision. The bills reported prior to the one
ultimately passed as the Natural Gas Act, H.R. 6586, 75th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1937), reported H.R. REP. No. 709, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937), did not include
this phrase following "sale." H.R. REP. No. 2651, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936) ;
Hearing Before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on
H.R?. 4008, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937) (substantially identical with H.R. 2651
that was actually introduced as H.R. 12680, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936), except
provision for certification of convenience and necessity was added).
The Syracuse Light Company of Syracuse, New York, an intermediate intra-
state wholesale sales company, proposed an amendment to the proposed statutory
definition of "natural gas company" providing for the insertion of "in interstate
commerce" immediately following "sale" to insure the act would not apply to its
local operations- wholesale sales in Syracuse and other parts within the state.
Before the aIiendment, section 2 of the proposed act defined a "natural gas com-
pany" as "a person engaged in the transportation of natural gas in interstate
commerce, or the sale of such gas for resale to the public, whether or not such
gas is mixed with artificial gas." Hearing Before the House Committee on Inter-
state and Foreign Commerce on H.R. 4008, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 103 (1937).
Syracuse's argument was simply that the bill as worded did not confine jurisdic-
tion to gas sold in interstate commerce. Ibid. The colloquy during this hearing
following the proposed amendment shows it was intended to limit the act's ap-
plication to sales of gas transported across state lines for wholesale sales and to
exempt the wholly local intervening companies. Ibid. The amendment was adopt-
ed and incorporated into the act. The statutory definition reads: " 'Natural-gas
company' means a person engaged in the transportation of natural gas in inter-
state commerce, or the sale in interstate commerce of such gas for resale." 52
Stat. 821 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 717a (6) (1958). Moreover, the Committee inserted
the phrase in the jurisdictional provision of the act. It is suggested this was re-
quired for consistency in the treatment of a "natural gas company" and the
exercise of jurisdiction over its sales. Note, Legislative History of the Natural
Gas Act, 44 GEO. L.J. 695, 717 (1956).
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point in a State and any point outside thereof, or between
points within the same State but through any place outside
thereof, but only insofar as such commerce takes place with-
in the United States." 7
Before Phillips, the interpretation of "in interstate commerce"
raised no appreciable controversy.8 During this era the most
7. 52 Stat. 821 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 717a(7) (1958).
8. In Kentucky Natural Gas Corp. v. Public Service Commission, 28 F. Supp.
509 (E.D. Ky. 1939), wholesale sales to local public utilities were found to be
in interstate commerce, conferring jurisdiction on the Commission notwithstanding
30% to 50% of the sales were of locally produced gas. The vendor was an inte-
grated pipeline whose wholesale sales were intermittently and generally to a
larger degree of gas from another state depending upon demand pressures in the
pipelines. The court found the wholesale sales an integral part of commerce be-
tween the states, saying, "under such circumstances, regulation in the public
interest is national rather than local, demanding a standard of uniformity unat-
tainable except through a single paramount authority." Id. at 512. "[T]he mere
fact that some gas from the interstate stream is sold and delivered in the state
of its origin affords that state no superior power to regulate or control the trans-
action." Id. at 513.
The United States Supreme Court sustained a Commission finding of juris-
diction over a company that distributed outstate natural gas wholly within its
state for local consumption, the gas having been received at the state line. Illi-
nois Gas Co. v. Central Illinois Public Service Co., 314 U.S. 498 (1942). The
transportation across the state line and subsequent wholesale sale of the gas was
enough to convince the Court jurisdiction was proper.
For Interstate Natural Gas Co. v. FPC (1947), see note 10 infra and accom-
panying text. Controversy over this case was not provoked by the Court's inter-
pretation of "in interstate commerce." The same may be said for FPC v. East
Ohio Gas Co., 338 U.S. 464 (1950), rev'd by Act of March 27, 1954, c. 115, 68
Stat. 36, 15 U.S.C. § 717(c) (1958), in which jurisdiction was exercised. There
it was held that outstate gas received by a distributor whose transportation and
wholesale sales were local, for local consumption, rendered it a natural gas com-
pany, the dissent being of opinion such local facilities were exempted by the local
distribution proviso of the act's jurisdictional provision. See § 717(b) note 6
supra. The reversing amendment exempts from the act distributors of interstate
gas-having traversed state lines-received at or within the distributor's state,
provided all the gas is consumed within that state and the rates, services, and
facilities are regulated by the state commission. Up to and including fiscal 1962,
128 exemptions have been issued by the FPC under the amendment. 42 FPC
ANN. REP. 92 (1962).
The wrath incurred by the Phillips decision was not over the Court's determi-
nation of interstate commerce. See note 11 infra. Phillips admitted its sales were
in interstate commerce. 347 U.S. at 677.
Determination that the transportation or sale of gas was in interstate com-
merce did not appear to be a difficult one for the court; at least one writer is
of the opinion this determination "is usually not a difficult one for the Commis-
sion." Legislation, The Proposed Amendment To The Natural Gas Act, 25 FORD-
HAM L. REV. 374, 376 (1956). It seems clear the Commission's jurisdictional
grant- "in interstate commerce" - is not as broad or inclusive as the congres-
sional power over interstate commerce as derived from the Commerce Clause. C/.
Wiekard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) ; United States v. Darby, 312 U.S.
100 (1941). More recently it was said the Commission's jurisdiction was nar-
rower than the scope of federal power under the commerce clause. Lo-Vaca
Gathering Co. v. FPC, 323 F.2d 190 (5th Cir. 1963). See Panhandle Eastern
Pipe Line Co. v. Public Service Commission of Indiana, 332 U.S. 507, 516, 517
(1947) (drawing jurisdictional line). Thus, Congress' power in regard to legis-
lation affecting interstate commerce would not seem to supply a criterion by
which the FPC or the courts might find FPC jurisdiction over a company predi-
1964] COMMENTS
significant decision interpreting this jurisdictional phrase was
Interstate Natural Gas Co. v. FPC (1947), 9 creating the destina-
tion theory of "in interstate commerce." Interstate held sales
of gas in the producing state to interstate pipelines, for trans-
portation and resale in other states, "in interstate commerce."'"
Phillips then opened the door to expanding federal regulation
by subjecting numerous smaller, independent producers, who
sold gas at the wellhead, to the provisions of the act." Since
cated on its transportation or sale of gas under any particular set of circum-
stances that would be within Congress' constitutional power to regulate. The
proper criterion is Congress' jurisdictional mandate to the agency charged with
responsibilities prescribed by Congress.
9. 331 U.S. 682.
10. In the Interstate case a producer sold locally produced gas from its main
field trunk lines to three interstate pipelines, each of which transported the gas
to markets in other states. Finding these sales in interstate commerce the Court
recognized the Commission's finding that " 'said gas is so destined from the mo-
ment of its production.' The Commission further found that 'The gas transported
and sold by Interstate to these three pipe line companies continues its flow in
interstate commerce and, as an established course of business well known to
Interstate, is destined for resale for ultimate public consumption in . . .markets
outside Louisiana.' " Id. at 687. "All the gas sold in these transactions is des-
tined for consumption in States other than Louisiana." Id. at 692. Cf. Public
Utilities Commission v. Attleboro Steam & Electric Co., 273 U.S. 83 (1927)
(vendor's lines crossed state line before reaching points of sale). The Court quoted
with approval from Jersey Central Power & Light Co. v. FPC, 319 U.S. 61, 69
(1943), to point out the lack of distinction between a sale at or before reaching
the state line, saying, "clearly the sales in question were a part of commerce
being carried on between points in Louisiana and points in other states." 331
U.S. at 688. Having previously quoted the act's definition of "interstate com-
merce," see text accompanying note 7 supra, the Court continued: "There is noth-
ing in that language to suggest that Congress intended that sales consummated
before the gas crosses a state line should not be regarded as being 'in' such com-
merce." 331 U.S. at 688.
Thus the Court created the destination theory of natural gas in interstate
commerce. In regard to electricity, see the Jersey Central Power & Light Co.
case supra.
Huit, National Regulation of the Natural-Gas Industry, in PUBLIC ADMINIS-
TRATION AND POLICY FORMATION 89-97 (Redford ed. 1956) discusses the Inter-
state case and attempts at congressional remedial legislation that were launched
in July 1947, the several proposals becoming known as the Kerr Bill. A detailed
account is given, ending with President Truman's veto in 1950. The issue cen-
tered over the production and gathering provision that came to a head in the
Phillips case. The President indicated the FPC had not regulated "arm's length
sales of non-transporting companies," but he believed it should be so empowered.
11. Phillips gathered gas for resale to interstate pipeline companies, frequent-
ly bringing it across state lines, processing it, and thereafter passing title. After
extensive litigation involving a host of intervenors- representatives of ten states,
four local units of government and many natural gas industry associations- the
United States Supreme Court held that the production and gathering exemption
of the act, 52 Stat. 821 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 717(b) (1958), see note 6 supra,
did not include wholesale sales to interstate pipeline companies. For an account
of the Phillips litigation and circumstances surrounding those events see Huit,
National Regulation of the Natural-Gas Industry, in PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
AND POLICY FORMATION 97-103 (Redford ed. 1956) ; a critical analysis appears
in Note, 44 GEO. L.J. 695 (1956) (legislative history of act thoroughly covered).
A number of bills were introduced to alleviate the impact of the Phillips de-
cision, H.R. 3703, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955) ; H.R. 3902, 84th Cong., 1st Sess.
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Phillips, the Commission has taken the initiative and continued
to broaden the application of its scope of federal regulations by
sweeping interpretations of "in interstate commerce," thereby
finding jurisdiction based on factual situations similar to those
in which jurisdiction previously had been denied. Principally,
these are the commingling situations 12 in which, for example,
gas to be sold in the producing state is mixed and transported
in the same pipeline with gas to be sold outside the producing
state.18
Preceding the Natural Gas Act the United States Supreme
Court did not consider gas produced and consumed in the same
state in interstate commerce merely because it was commingled
(1955) ; H.R. 3940, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955); H.R. 3941, 84th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1955) ; H.R. 4214, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955) ; H.R. 4560, 84th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1955), one having survived as a clear bill, Report of the Committee
on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on S. 1858, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955),
that would have exempted independent producers and gatherers from regulation
under the act. It suffered a presidential veto. H.R. EXEC. Doc. No. 342, 84th
Cong. 2d Sess. (1956). Legislation, The Proposed Amendment to the Natural
Gas Act, 25 FonDnAm L. RaV. 374, 379 (1956), presents views of proponents
and opponents of the vetoed amendment. In support of the Phillips decision see
arguments made by Ison, Conflicts of State and Federal Jurisdiction in the Regu-
lation of Natural Gas and Electricity, 10 MERCER L. Ruv. 226, 237 (1959). For
a comprehensive summary of legislative, administrative, and judicial events pre-
ceding and relevant to the court of appeals decision in Phillips, State of Wiscon-
sin v. FPC, 205 F.2d 706 (D.C. Cir. 1953), and for a critique of that decision
and a discussion of issues raised at that time concerning the extent of the Com-
mission's jurisdiction over production and gathering of natural gas, see McLane,
Jurisdiction of the Federal Power Commission over Production and Gathering of
Gas, 28 TuL. L. REV. 343 (1953).
Phillips opened the door to broader interpretations of the Commission's juris-
dictional grant -"in interstate commerce."
The independent producers that limited their activities to production and
gathering were no longer free from federal regulation when selling to interstate
piplines. Their only avenue of escape from federal regulation, aside from appeals
to Congress that failed, was in showing their sales were not in interstate com-
merce. A line of cases in which independents attempted such a showing followed
in the wake of Phillips. Cities Service Gas Co. v. State Corp. Comm'n, 180 Kan.
454, 304 P.2d 528 (1956), rev'd per curiam, 355 U.S. 391 (1958) ; Saturn Oil &
Gas Co. v. FPC, 250 F.2d 61 (10th Cir. 1957) ; Deep South Oil Co. v. FPC, 247
F.2d 882 (5th Cir. 1957), noted 18 LA. L. REV. 578 (1958) ; and companion
cases, Continental Oil Co. v. FPC, 247 F.2d 904 vice id. at 904; Humble Oil &
Refining Co. v. FPC, id. at 903; and Shell Oil Co. v. FPC, id. at 900; FPC v.
Huber Corp., 133 F. Supp. 479 (D. N.J. 1955). The impact of these decisions
was that gas sold at the wellhead, or at some point a short distance removed
therefrom, which was eventually to flow into interstate commerce was in inter-
state commerce as defined in the act, regardless of the purpose for which the gas
was sold and the processes to which it was put. For an individual treatment of
these cases see Note, 11 OKLA. L. REv. 337 (1958).
12. Such cases essentially involve the indistinguishable commingling of natural
gas from different sources and destined for dissimilar uses and different areas or
markets, and will be discussed in detail.
13. A commingling situation is one in which natural gas having one legal or
contractual characteristic is mixed in a pipeline with natural gas having another
legal or contractual characteristic.
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with outstate gas by the vendor, provided the quantity received
and sold as local gas was determinable. 14 Following the act, the
first commingling cases involved situations analogous to the
commingling of intrastate and interstate gas. These cases were
concerned with the commingling of gas in interstate commerce
sold to distributors for resale with gas for direct industrial
consumption, the Commission having no jurisdiction over the
latter. 15 It was said, then held, that the existence of a separate
transaction identifying the amount to be used for direct con-
sumption precluded federal regulation of that sale; thus com-
mingling of exempted and covered gas did not ipso facto sub-
ject the former to jurisdiction.' 6 When the issue was squarely
faced whether locally produced gas, sold under contractual pro-
vision for metering and sale within the state of production, was
in interstate commerce by virtue of being commingled with gas
destined for interstate markets, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the Commission's re-
fusal to accept jurisdiction.' 7 Identification of an intrastate
volume of gas would allow that portion of gas, although indis-
tinguishably commingled with interstate gas, to retain its intra-
state character. Then the FPC rendered the Lo-Vaca Gathering
Co.' and United Gas Pipe Line Co.'9 decisions which apparently
14. People's Natural Gas Co. v. Public Service Commission, 270 U.S. 550
(1926). There was no contractual distinction of the gas produced and consumed
in the same state. The Court simply found enough locally produced gas was
present in the total commingled flow from which the wholesale sale in question
was drawn to account for a sale of intrastate gas. It recognized the wholesale
sale involved no greater quantity than the amount of locally produced gas trans-
ported in the pipeline.
15. 52 Stat. 821 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 717(b) (1958) : "The provisions of this
chapter shall apply . . . to the sale in interstate commerce of natural gas for
resale." (Emphasis added.)
16. United States v. Public Utilities Commission of California, 345 U.S. 295
(1953) involved a sale of energy that traversed a state line, only a portion
thereof to be resold. The Court assumed arguendo the energy could be divided for
jurisdictional purposes, but then found the absence of a separate transaction
by which the power directly consumed by the purchaser could he identified. Two
years later it was held that separate transactions distinguished commingled gas
for resale from gas for direct industrial consumption. City of Hastings v. FPC,
221 F.2d 31 (D.C. Cir. 1955). The court said: "The entire course of dealings
clearly permitted the Commission to find the existence of separate rates, separate
billings, separate negotiations, separate contracts, separate allocation of gas and
effective separate measurement facilities." Id. at 36.
17. North Dakota v. FPC, 247 F. 2d 173 (8th Cir. 1957). The contract at
issue provided for "firm gas" wholesale sales to an interstate pipeline to be trans-
ported therein with other locally produced gas destined for markets outside the
producing state as provided for by "dump gas" contract. The "firm gas" was to
be separated into laterals for use in four towns of the state of production.
18. 40 P.U.R.3d 257 (1961), rev'd and remanded, Lo-Vaca Gathering Co. v.
FPC, 323 F. 2d 190 (5th Cir. 1963).
19. Docket No. CP62-161 (Aug. 26, 1963).
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marked an abandonment of the Commission's former judicially
supported position and raised the question whether future com-
mingling situations will lead to federal or state regulatory con-
trol.
In Lo-Vaca, Houston Pipe Line Company contracted to sell
for resale Texas produced natural gas to El Paso Natural Gas
Company for consumption wholly within Texas. 2 Through the
complexity of El Paso's pipelines in which the gas was to be
routed,21 Houston's gas was to be indistinguishably commingled
with gas from other producers destined for consumption out-
side Texas; then an amount equal to Houston's sales volume
was to be metered from the lines in Texas. Upon proceedings
by petition for a declaratory order to remove uncertainty as to
the Commission's jurisdiction over Houston's proposed sale, the
FPC found Houston a natural gas company within the meaning
of the act and its proposed sales subject to its jurisdiction.22
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit re-
versed, holding physical commingling of gas intended for local
consumption with gas destined for outstate markets, the same
quantity of the former placed in the mixed stream being metered
therefrom in the producing state, does not destroy the status of
the former as intrastate, non-jurisdictional gas.23
Shortly preceding the Lo-Vaca reversal the Commission exer-
cised jurisdiction over wholesale sales of natural gas by United
Gas Pipe Line Company to Louisiana distributors for consump-
tion in Louisiana. United purchased gas from onshore Louisi-
ana producers and transported it in an interstate, fully inte-
grated pipeline to customers in Louisiana. 24 After the Louisiana
20. The contract provided the gas "shall be used and consumed by El Paso
solely as fuel in the operation of El Paso's plant and in the gasoline plant of
Phillips Petroleum Company in Ector County, all located wholly within the State
of Texas." Lo-Vaca Gathering Co. v. FPC, 40 P.U.R.3d at 260.
21. Id. at 260.
22. "The sale and delivery of natural gas by . . . Houston as hereinabove
described, and as further described in the record and in the application, would
result in . . . Houston being engaged in the transportation of natural gas in
interstate commerce, and in the sale in interstate commerce of such gas for re-
sale, and . . . Houston thereby would become [a] natural gas [company] within
the meaning of the Natural Gas Act, and [its] respective sales to El Paso would
be subject to our jurisdiction." Id. at 268.
23. Lo-Vaca Gathering Co. v. FPC, 323 F.2d 190 (5th Cir. 1963).
24. United's wholesale sales of gas are from two interstate pipelines, the
Kosciusko and Lirette-Mobile lines, and involve the sale of offshore gas, also.
Since the character of offshore gas is not within the scope of this Comment, it
should be noted that the factual setting is that surrounding the wholesale sales
[Vol. XXIV
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sales, the remainder of the gas continued its journey in United's
pipeline to markets in other states.25 The Commission held gas
entering an interstate pipeline acquired an interstate character,
unalterable even upon separation from the pipeline for con-
sumption in the producing state. Alternatively, the Commission
seems to have held gas is "in interstate commerce" when its
state-made wholesale rates burden interstate commerce. 26
An analysis of the Commission's position reveals the irregu-
larity of its determination that the gas involved was within the
ambit of the act's definition of interstate commerce.2 7 In each
instance the Commission looked at the "essential character of
the commerce ' 28 to determine that the sales were "in interstate
commerce." In Lo-Vaca jurisdiction was justified solely by the
impossibility of molecular identification of the gas, while in
United the unalterable interstate characteristic of the gas was
from the Lirette-Mobile line, gas sold from that line coming from onshore Lou-
isiana. The offshore gas is transported through the Kosciusko line.
Although the Commission found that customers receiving gas principally from
onshore Louisiana "possibly still receive Mississippi produced gas from the north-
south line extending to Louisiana and Mississippi and gas flowing westerly from
Mississippi in United's Lirette-Mobile line," this finding will not be discussed;
it raised an issue concerning backflow gas that was not essential to the part
of the opinion discussed in this Comment.
Alternatively, the Commission held the wholesale sales in question in interstate
commerce by application of an "interdependence-substantial impact" test that
purportedly showed the impact that the sales in question had upon United's
interstate business in that it was conducted by a wholly integrated, interstate
pipeline system. The Commission was of the opinion "narrow 'tests' should be
avoided." United Gas Pipe Line Co., Docket No. CP62-161 (Aug. 26, 1963).
The Commission's proof that gas conveyed by the sales in question from the
Lirette-Mobile line had traversed a state boundary was less than convincing,
the opinion never stating in language stronger than "conceivably" or "possibly"
that the gas had crossed the Mississippi-Louisiana boundary. Moreover, on ap-
plication for rehearing, United filed an application setting forth errors in findings
of fact that should eliminate this holding altogether, leaving only the more im-
portant ones dealt with in this Comment for consideration.
25. Approximately 97% of United's gas continued its journey into other
states. United Gas Pipe Line Co., Docket No. CP62-161 (Aug. 26, 1963).
26. United Gas Pipe Line Co., Docket No. CP62-161 (Aug. 26, 1963), rehear-
ing granted Oct. 24, 1963. The Commission's summary treatment of Houston,
E. & W.T. R.R. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342 (1914) apparently was for the
purpose of holding the disputed sales jurisdictional in that they worked a burden
on interstate commerce. This argument is fully developed beginning with the
text accompanying note 41 infra.
27. See text accompanying note 7 supra.
28. In Lo-Vavac the Commission said: "It is the 'nature of the beast' not the
label that is controlling. It has been held that whether a transaction is in inter-
state commerce is determined by the essential character of the commerce, not
necessarily by the contract. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Standard Oil Co.(1927) 275 U.S. 257, 268 .... " 40 P.U.R.3d at 264. The United case cites the
Atlantic Coast Line R.R. case in support of its following statement: "In reaching
the conclusion that the gas here in question is 'in interstate commerce,' we feel
that narrow 'tests' should be avoided and instead, that the entire spectrum of
pertinent factors should be examined." Docket No. CP62-161 (Aug. 26, 1963).
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buttressed by jurisprudential authorities. The court of appeals
brushed aside the physical properties of the gas, making it quite
clear the laws of physics do not dictate principles of constitu-
tional law and statutory construction.29 The authorities that
buttressed the United conclusion require examination. °
Deep South Oil Co. v. FPC31 was cited for the proposition
that once gas has been sold for resale by a producer to an inter-
state pipeline it has commenced its journey in interstate com-
merce, even though some of that gas is to be sold in the pro-
ducing state.8 2  Apparently impressed by the intrastate sales
by the pipeline in Deep South, the Commission concluded
United's wholesale sales of gas having an interstate character
in the pipeline were in interstate commerce. Deep South in-
volved wholesale sales by a producer to an interstate pipeline,
not a subsequent wholesale sale by the pipeline in the state of
consumption. It does not follow from that decision that gas
commingled in an interstate pipeline cannot reacquire its intra-
state character by a subsequent sale for consumption in the
state of production. The sale by Deep South to the interstate
pipeline imparted an interstate character to the gas by destina-
tion as did the producer's sale to United;33 but the sales at
wholesale by United deprived the gas of opportunity to traverse
a state boundary, thereby preventing its fictitious interstate
character from maturing. Moreover, the language is simply
29. The court quoted from Judge Brown's dissenting opinion in Deep South
Oil Co. v. FPC, 247 F.2d 882, 891 (5th Cir. 1957) : "'[T]he principles of con-
stitutional law and statutory construction are not equated with laws of physics,
so that the inquiry is something more than the schoolboy's quest for molecular
identification.' " Lo-Vaca Gathering Co. v. FPC, 323 F.2d 190, 191 (5th Cir.
1963).
30. Note the Commission merely buttresses its finding that interstate gas
has an unalterable characteristic, and cites no direct authority for this proposi-
tion. The pertinent language: "Thus, the entire gas stream is, in the most literal
sense, 'in interstate commerce'. The removal of a portion of the gas thus flowing
in interstate commerce does not change the gas removed from the stream into
intrastate gas. This conclusion is buttressed by the fact that the transactions
between United and the producers who sold the gas in question are clearly within
our jurisdiction." United Gas Pipe Line Co., Docket No. CP62-161 (Aug. 26,
1963). The Commission then refers to decisions it found to support its jurisdic-
tion over such sales.
31. 247 F.2d 882 (5th Cir. 1957), noted 18 LA. L. REv. 578 (1958).
32. The gas was sold for processing after which a portion was resold by the
processor for transportation and resale in interstate commerce. The court said:
"As to petitioner's claim that its sales are 'local' in character, we think it plain
that they are sales 'in interstate commerce' for the obvious reason that the sale
of gas originating in one state and its transmission and delivery to distributors
in any other state constitutes interstate commerce. . . . Cf. Federal Power Com-
mission v. East Ohio Gas Co., 338 U.S. 464, 467 . . . ." Id. at 887.




that the gas sold for resale by Deep South "commenced its
journey in interstate commerce. '3 4 Consumption of gas in the
producing state simply was not at issue and not discussed. It
is submitted Deep South is clearly not authority for the conclu-
sion reached in the United case.
The FPC buttressed its conclusion further by relying upon
the Court's language, in Phillips Petroleum Corp. v. Wisconsin,25
that jurisdiction vested over "wholesales" occurring anytime
before or after transmission, 36 and by relying upon the presence
of sales in the purchasing state by the interstate pipelines that
bought from Phillips. 37 Not only was "in interstate commerce"
not at issue in Phillips,3 8 but the language the Commission re-
lied upon suggests no definition of "in interstate commerce. ' 39
Furthermore, it does not appear the Court considered the sale
of any gas in the producing state. It is submitted the Phillips
decision is not authority for the Commission's conclusion.
Lastly, the FPC relied on its Lo-Vaca proposition that what
the parties actually do with the gas determines its status and
not their verbal or written provisions for the transaction. 40
34. See quoted material note 32 supra. The court continued: "Petitioner
admits . . . 'there is a continuous flow of gas from the Deep South wells into
the gathering system of Texas Gas; that the mass of gas of which the Deep
South gas becomes a part moves continuously through the gathering system into
a processing plant; that the movement through the processing plant is con-
tinuous; that there is a continuous movement of natural gas from the outlet
of the processing plant to both interstate and intrastate destinations. * * *'
Accordingly, and in the light of all the uncontroverted facts, we hold that when
the gas was sold by petitioner it had commenced its journey in interstate com-
merce." 247 F.2d at 887.
35. 347 U.S. 672 (1954). See note 11 supra.
36. " '[Tlhe legislative history [of the Natural Gas Act] indicates a Con-
gressional intent to give the Commission jurisdiction over the rates of all whole-
sale of natural gas in interstate commerce, whether by a pipeline company or not
and whether occurring before, during, or after transmission by an interstate pipe-
line company.'" (Emphasis added.) United Gas Pipe Line Co., Docket No.
CP62-161 (Aug. 26, 1963), citing Phillips Petroleum Corp. v. Wisconsin, 347
U.S. 672, 692 (1954).
37. The Commission seems to have reasoned the wholesale sales by United
were in interstate commerce because the wholesale sales by the interstate pipelines
in Phillips did not render Phillips' sales to the pipelines non-jurisdictional. The
Commission said, "the Court was apparently untroubled by the fact that some
of the purchasing pipelines resold the gas bought from Phillips within the state
in which it was purchased." United Gas Pipe Line Co., Docket No. CP62-161
(Aug. 26, 1963).
38. Phillips admitted its sales were in interstate commerce, Phillips Petroleum
Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672, 677 (1954) (issue was whether Phillips' sales
were part of the production and gathering process).
39. See note 36 supra. The quoted language merely defines the breadth of
interstate commerce in which sales therein may occur.
40. "[T]he touchstone to the question whether a sale of gas is for resale in
interstate commerce is what is done with the gas, not what the parties may say
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This case is no authority for the United position notwithstand-
ing its reversal. It is inapposite to United because the possi-
bility at least existed that consumption might occur outside the
producing state. It does not stand for the "unalterable inter-
state character" of natural gas sold under conditions whereby
consumption in the producing state is certain.
The alternative holding that gas is "in interstate commerce"
when state-made rates of local gas burden interstate commerce
is gleaned from the Commission's summary treatment of the
Shreveport Rate Case41 in United. Though the Commission
made no effort to develop an analogy to this case, it seems the
import was that United's wholesale rates of natural gas pro-
duced, transported, and consumed wholly in Louisiana unjustly
discriminated against rates of gas similarly transported by
United to outstate markets. 42 In Shreveport the United States
Supreme Court found no basis for exempting from the Inter-
state Commerce Commission's jurisdiction 43 interstate carriers
that discriminated against interstate traffic by lower intrastate
rates; it appears the FPC also found no basis for exempting
United's wholesale sales, for it concluded neither the language
of the Natural Gas Act alone nor its legislative history was
conclusive in determining jurisdiction over these sales. 44 The
about the transaction, verbally or in writing." Lo-Vaca Gathering Co., 40
P.U.R.3d 257, 266 (1961).
41. Houston, E. & W.T. R.R. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342 (1914). The
Commission's summary treatment of this case was as follows: "We do not
accept the view that because the gas did not leave the State, it cannot be 'in
interstate commerce'. In placing substantial reliance upon this factor, the ex-
aminer cited as his authority . . . (the Shreveport Rate Case) . . . and North
Carolina v. United States, 325 U.S. 507 (1945)." United Gas Pipe Line Co.,
Docket No. CP62-161 (Aug. 26, 1963). The Commission did not allude to the
Shreveport case again.
42. The FPC (lid find the rates of United's wholesale sales 9 cents per Mcf
lower than it would have prescribed. United Gas Pipe Line Co., Docket No.
CP62-161 (Aug. 26, 1963). In Shreveport the United States Supreme Court
held rates of freight wholly transported within a state discriminated against
freight coming into the state from a comparable distance at higher rates, thus
unjustly discriminating against interstate commerce, the two transportation
situations being similar. Note the Court found discrimination, not merely the
power to discriminate, by state-made intrastate rates. Without discriminating
against interstate commerce the states may make intrastate rates. Minnesota
Rate Cases, 230 U.S. 352 (1913) ; see quotation in note 5 supra.
43. After discussing a provision of the Interstate Commerce Act proscribing
discrimination by carriers, the Supreme Court said "there is no exception or
qualification with respect to an unreasonable discrimination against interstate
traffic produced by the relation of intrastate to interstate rates as maintained by
the carrier . . . and there is no basis for the contention that Congress intended
to exempt any discriminatory action or practice of interstate carriers affecting
interstate commerce which it had authority to reach." Houston, E. & W.T. R.R.
v. United States, 234 U.S. 342, 356 (1914).
44. "As noted earlier, whether or not the disputed sales are subject to this
1964] COMMENTS 611
Supreme Court in Shreveport reasoned that Congress' power to
terminate unjust discrimination against interstate rates was
properly executed through its subordinate body, the ICC,45 not-
withstanding a proviso in the Interstate Commerce Act exempt-
ing transportation wholly within one state. 46 The controlling
provision of the act 47 "sweeping enough to embrace all the dis-
criminations of the sort described,' 48 on which the Supreme
Court relied was Congress' mandate expressly proscribing dis-
crimination.
The Natural Gas Act may differ significantly from the
Interstate Commerce Act in that "interstate commerce" is ex-
pressly defined in the former,49 while not in the latter. More-
over, the Natural Gas Act contains no express mention of dis-
crimination as does the Interstate Commerce Act, although the
legislative history of the Natural Gas Act reveals that, at least
for some, discrimination among buyers of natural gas was a
target of the act.50 Furthermore, "interstate commerce" does
Commission's jurisdiction cannot be determined from the language of the Act
alone. In addition, we feel that the legislative history of the Natural Gas Act
is also inconclusive." United Gas Pipe Line Co., Docket No. CP62-161 (Aug.
26, 1963).
45. "It is for Congress to supply the needed correction where the relation
between intrastate and interstate rates presents the evil to be corrected, and this
it may do completely by reason of its control over the interstate carrier in all
matters having such a close and substantial relation to interstate commerce that
it is necessary or appropriate to exercise the control for the effective government
of that commerce ...
"Having this power, Congress could provide for its execution through the aid
of a subordinate body; and we conclude that the order of the Commission now
in question cannot be held invalid upon the ground that it exceeded the authority
which Congress could lawfully confer." Houston, E. & W.T. R.R. v. United
States, 234 U.S. 342, 355 (1914).
46. "Provided, however, that the provisions of this act shall not apply to the
transportation of passengers or property, or to the receiving, delivering, storage,
or handling of property, wholly within one State, and not shipped to or from
a foreign country from or to any State or Territory as aforesaid." Id. at 356.
47. "Section three of the Act to Regulate Commerce provides (February 4,
1887, c. 104, 24 Stat. 379, 380):
"'SEc. 3. That it shall be unlawful for any common carrier subject to the
provisions of this act to make or give any undue or unreasonable preference or
advantage to any particular person, company, firm, corporation, or locality, or
any particular description of traffic, in any respect whatsoever, or to subject
any particular person, company, firm, corporation, or locality, or any particular
description of traffic, to any undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage in
any respect whatsoever.' " Id. at 355.
48. Id. at 356.
49. " 'Interstate commerce' means commerce between any point in a State
and any point outside thereof, or between points within the same State but
through any place outside thereof, but only insofar as such commerce takes
place within the United States." 52 Stat. 821 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 717a(7)
(1958).
50. During Senate debate of H.R. 6586, ultimately passed as the Natural Gas
Act, Senator Minton alluded to discrimination against domestic purchasers by
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not appear in the provision proscribing discrimination in the
Interstate Commerce Act.5' In any event, jurisdiction under
the Shreveport Rate Case rationale should not lie unless an evil
sought to be eliminated by the act is found to exist.512 The pri-
mary target of the act was plugging the gap in regulation of
transactions in interstate commerce to check the ultimate fear-
exploitation and discrimination by monopoly power. 53 The Com-
mission's summary treatment of the Shreveport Rate Case and
its failure to discuss discrimination or exploitation cause doubt
whether either evil was believed to exist in United.54
It seems the United case could not have presented a more
clearly identifiable situation or event for determining a local
quantity of natural gas - locally produced gas being sold for
resale in the state of production for consumption therein. More-
over, "interstate commerce" as defined by the act clearly ex-
cludes gas produced, sold, and consumed within the same state. 55
Thus, the absence of jurisprudential or statutory support for the
affiliated pipelines selling to the latter at higher rates than were charged the
affiliated industrial users. 81 Cong. Rec. 9312, 9315 (1937). Mr. Wheeler's reply
was "Yes. At the present time, some of the pipe lines that are selling at whole-
sale will sell to one community at a certain price, and sell to another community
at another price. They are permitted to sell to one industry at one price, and to
sell to another industry at another price. In other words, the present state of
affairs permits the old racket of rebates and discriminations against cities and
against counties and against municipalities, and against particular industries in
a community." Ibid. The gas referred to by Mr. Minton was that which was
brought into his state by the discriminating pipelines.
51. See note 47 supra.
52. This is best exemplified by the destination theory of natural gas in inter-
state commerce as created by the Interstate Natural Gas case. See note 10
aupra.
53. The report of the Natural Gas Act recognizes this gap. -I.R. REP. No.
709, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1937). See 2d note 5 supra. The fear of monopoly
power appears from Mr. Lea's remarks, Hearings Before the House Committee
on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on H.R. 11662, 74th Cong. 2d Sess. 26
(1936) : "I suppose the broad question that Mr. Cooper presents is whether or
not it is necessary to have regulation of gas in interstate shipment or transporta-
tion. The theory of the bill, I take it, would be that the State regulation is
necessary, as on a public-utility basis and without interstate regulation there is
a gap in regulation. The consumption in the State is secured largely through
interstate transmission and the cost of the interstate production is, of course, a
very material element in determining the price the local people must pay for
their gas. So that if complete regulation is necessary, it would involve interstate
regulation." Mr. DeVan, Solicitor, Federal Power Commission, replied: "That
is correct, Mr. Chairman." Ibid.
54. See note 41 supra.
55. See note 49 supra. An interesting sidelight upon whether a strict inter-
pretation of "in interstate commerce" precludes jurisdiction over the sales in
question herein is raised by Commissioner O'Connor, dissenting in United. He
said in the Shreveport Rate Cases the court accepted as "self-evident the prin-
ciple that railroad traffic between two points in Texas was intrastate, although
the trains and railroad lines which carried the intrastate traffic went to and
served markets outside the State." Docket No. CP62-161 (Aug. 26, 1963).
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Commission's finding that United's wholesale sales were in in-
terstate commerce and thus within its jurisdiction suggest a
strained interpretation of "in interstate commerce" in an at-
tempt to broaden federal jurisdiction to encompass commingling
situations.56
Though the Commission would have it appear its jurisdic-
tion rested solely on its purported judicially supported interpre-
tation of its statutory grant,5 7 it seems that additional consid-
erations provoked the extended coverage given "in interstate
commerce." ' The Commission considered the threat of buyers'
discrimination between suppliers;59 possible cost increases to
interstate customers, placing them at competitive disadvan-
tage ;60 vulnerability of interstate rates to increments due to ir-
responsible state ratemaking;61 and maintenance of the federal
56. Moreover, the Commission ignored analogous authority to the contrary.
See United States v. Public Utilities of California, 345 U.S. 295 (1953) ; People's
Gas Co. v. Public Service Commission, 270 U.S. 550 (1926) (commingling situa-
tion preceding the act) ; North Dakota v. FPC, 247 F.2d 173 (8th Cir. 1957)
City of Hastings v. FPC, 221 F.2d 31 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
57. This follows from the Commission's findings that the gas was "in inter-
state commerce." In Lo-Vaca the Commission said: "The record makes it clear
that because of commingling, the gas from Houston and Lo-Vaca would in part
be consumed by El Paso either within or outside Texas and would in part be
carried on to El Paso's customers in New Mexico, Arizona and California."
40 P.U.R.3d 257, 261 (1961). The United opinion states: "The most important
consideration leading to the conclusion that these sales are in interstate com-
merce is that the gas sold is part of a single, uniform stream flowing through
United's interstate pipeline from the point of purchase in Louisiana, whether
onshore or offshore, to United's customers in other states. Thus, the entire gas
stream is, in the most liberal sense, 'in interstate commerce'. The removal of a
portion of the gas thus flowing in interstate commerce does not change the gas
removed from the stream into intrastate gas." Docket No. CP62-161 (Aug. 26,
1963). Alternatively, the Commission held the wholesale sales in question in
interstate commerce owing to the wholly integrated nature of United's pipeline
system. It said: " 'The established course of business being predominantly inter-
state, the mere fact that some gas from the interstate stream is sold and delivered
in the state of its origin affords that state no superior power to regulate or
control the transaction.' " Ibid. Quoting from Kentucky Natural Gas Corp. v.
Public Service Commission, 28 F. Supp. 509, 513 (D. Ky. 1939). Therein, due
to the wholly integrated pipeline system, gas consumed in Kentucky was either
Indiana or Kentucky gas depending upon pressures within the system. In regard
to this holding see note 8 supra.
58. "In the light of these considerations, and because we think the gas United
sells is clearly in the stream of interstate commerce, we conclude that the sales
in question are subject to our jurisdiction." United Gas Pipe Line Co., Docket
No. CP62-161 (Aug. 26, 1963).
59. "It would be possible for a pipeline to discriminate among producers by
giving certain ones the privilege of selling to it the gas which by agreement
would be deemed to be segregated from the interstate stream and to be resold
and consumed in the state of production or used in compressor stations. This may
increase the cost to interstate customers and at the same time put them at a
competitive disadvantage in obtaining additional supplies of gas." Lo-Vaca
Gathering Co., 40 P.U.R.3d 257, 266 (1961).
60. See note 59 supra.
61. "There is also an inter-relation between the rates for these sales in Lou-
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regulatory scheme.6 2 These considerations might well be dis-
pensed with by the simple submission that they are not within
the expressed jurisdictional test prescribed by the act- the
definition of interstate commerce 63 -that the House of Repre-
sentatives and Senate committees both found self-explanatory.
4
Nonetheless, examination of these considerations is deemed war-
ranted for it is submitted they fail on their merits as justifica-
tion for jurisdiction.
Maintenance of a sensible federal regulatory scheme is per-
haps the most forceful consideration seemingly provocative of a
finding of jurisdiction. The price in any sale of natural gas
ultimately consumed in an interstate market affects the price
paid by the interstate consumer.0 , Thus, "in interstate com-
merce" was readily extended to producers' sales under the desti-
nation theory. But, United's wholesale sales to Louisiana dis-
tributors could not be more clearly inapposite to the wholesale
isiana and United's sales outside the state, for if Louisiana sets rates that are
too low, and United's return is consequently reduced, its capital costs may rise.
Increased capital costs would normally be reflected in higher interstate rates."
United Gas Pipe Line Co., Docket No. CP62-161 (Aug. 26, 1963). In a footnote
the Commission pointed out the Louisiana rate for the wholesale sales involved
is "almost 90 per Mef lower than that set by this Commission." It is significant
the criticism levied here is part of the "interdependence-substantial impact" test
earlier espoused by the Commission as an all-inclusive jurisdictional criterion. See
3d note 24 supra.
Other considerations mentioned in the United opinion not dealt with in the
text are United's use of gas for the wholesale sales involved, which gas was pur-
chased under producer rate schedules subject to FPC jurisdiction, without regard
for the markets to which the gas was destined, and lack of authority to certify
the wholesale sales at issue so that gas dedicated to interstate commerce might be
used intrastate to the detriment of the former wholesale sales. Docket No. CP62-
161 (Aug. 26, 1963). It is believed proper allocation of gas to the various inter-
state markets, causing United to live up to its interstate commitments is the
proper solution for the considerations here raised.
62. "[Wle are compelled to ask whether a statutory scheme which would
include wholesale sales at one end of a pipeline but would exclude the same
sales, from a common stream, if made at the other end of a pipeline, would
make sense. We think it would not." United Gas Pipe Line Co., Docket No.
CP62-161 (Aug. 26, 1963). The F'PC refers the reader to H.R. REP. No. 709,
75th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, and cases cited therein (1937). See 2d note 5 supra.
Public Service Commission v. Attleboro Steam & Electric Co., 273 U.S. 83 (1927)
and Missouri v. Kansas Gas Co., 265 U.S. 298 (1924) are the cases cited therein,
none of which faced the issue whether a wholesale sale of gas or energy like
United's to its Louisiana customers was in interstate commerce.
63. See note 49 supra.
64. H.R. REP. No. 709, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1937); S. REP. No. 1162,
75th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1937). Federal Power Commissioner O'Connor (dis-
senting in part) in United Gas Pipe Line Co., Docket No. CP62-161 (Aug. 26,
1963) said: "Obviously the only self-explanatory interpretation of 'commerce
between any point in a State and any point outside thereof' is one which is con-
fined to exactly those events-and which patently excludes the disputed sales
involving only commerce between two points in the same State."
65. In United the Commission was not expressly fearful of this effect. See
note 62 supra.
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sales to which the fictitious "destined for interstate commerce"
applies. The prices of United's sales solely to consumers within
the state of production could only indirectly affect interstate
rates. The gas fictitiously in interstate commerce becomes des-
tined for consumption in the state of production upon the whole-
sale sale in question and is in fact consumed in such state. More-
over, it clearly appears from Senate debate as it does from the
act's definition of interstate commerce that gas produced and
sold at wholesale for consumption in the same state was ex-
cluded from the coverage of the act;66 therefore, it should not
be subjected to control for the maintenance of the federal regu-
latory scheme.6 7
66. Senate debate of the here-pertinent provisions of H.R. 6586, ultimately
passed as the Natural Gas Act, appears in 81 Cong. Rec. 9312 (1937) as follows:
"Mr. BORAH. Mr. President, as I understand, the bill is confined to the regula-
tion of interstate commerce? Mr. WHEELER . . . . That is all, and nothing
else." Id. at 9314. "Mr. WHEELER .... The Federal Power Commission will
have power to regulate the price of gas shipped and sold at wholesale in interstate
commerce." Id. at 9315. "Mr. WHEELER. It will be of the greatest benefit,
as a matter of fact, to every large city, and every user of gas that is shipped
wholesale. My State is not at all affected by the bill, because all our gas is
produced in the State. Therefore, the bill does not affect us in the slightest
degree; but the authorities of . . . every single city in the United States that
imports gas, have written me and begged me and pleaded with me to try to get
this bill passed." Ibid. "Mr. WHEELER. This bill, of course, could not affect
the price charged by the People's Gas Co. [that sold to Chicago for consumption
therein] for gas produced in the State of Illinois, but when gas is brought into
a State and sold at wholesale, the Federal authorities may simply go to the
extent of saying, "A reasonable price for this gas which is shipped at wholesale
is so much'-just as they fix rates for railroads." Ibid.
Such discussions appear limited in the legislative history of the act, probably
because it was understood the act did not cover gas or wholesale sales of gas
not traversing a state boundary. The definition of "interstate commerce" con-
tained in the act is explicit. See note 49 supra. After quoting at length from
H.R. REP. No. 709, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1937), see 2d note 5 supra, the
Commission correctly says: "The report does not state whether the Committee
considered gas sold for resale by interstate pipelines in the states in which it was
purchased- intrastate or interstate- although federal regulation of such sales
would clearly be within Congress' power." United Gas Pipe Line Co., Docket
No. CP62-161 (Aug. 26, 1963). However true this may be, it is submitted the
Senate debate above quoted shows it was considered in the Senate and there
thought to be without the Commission's jurisdiction. Furthermore, the above
colloquy shows the error in the following statement made in the course of the
United opinion: "In the absence of a direct statement of what Congress intended,
we must attempt to determine what Congress would have said about this par-
ticular problem if it had been brought to its attention." Ibid.
67. In regard to Houston's wholesale sales it seems sufficient to say if El Paso
failed to use all Houston's gas in Texas, it would be time for the FPC to regulate
that portion being ultimately consumed outside the state of production, but until
that time the good faith provisions of the parties should prevail as an identifying
fact.
Under 52 Stat. 826 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 717i (1958) the Commission could
ascertain where the gas is actually being consumed in regard to volume by re-
quiring reports and records necessary to make such determination. That section
provides as follows: "Every natural-gas company shall file with the Commission
such annual and other periodic or special reports as the Commission may by
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In Lo-Vaca the Commission expressed the fear that possible
cost increments from discrimination would raise interstate
rates,6 while in United it named irresponsible state ratemaking
as another cause of this increment. 69 Thus, it feared the com-
petitive disadvantage to interstate customers that might result
from lack of federal regulation of intrastate sales. But inter-
state rates might be determined 70 from intrastate and interstate
costs regardless of the actual rate for intrastate sales, thereby
keeping interstate rates reasonable and unaffected by any state's
ratemaking. By the Commission's failure to show that any pre-
vious increments in interstate rates resulted from insufficient
intrastate rates, or that an independent allocation-of-cost deter-
mination was unworkable, these considerations lose force.71
The Commission's fear that buyers might discriminate
among suppliers 72 presupposes some detriment flowing from the
competitive selection of instate producers - a competition
without which such producers might not seek the most efficient
means of operation - which, notwithstanding state rate regula-
tion, would cause higher state-wide natural gas rates. More-
over, Senate debate shows that the act's primary target as to
discrimination was that practiced by interstate pipelines affil-
iated with instate industry against public distributors and vari-
ous industries, and that wholesale rates of locally produced gas
were to remain subject to state regulation.73 Thus this last im-
portant buttressing consideration 74 is of questionable merit.
rules and regulations or order prescribe as necessary or appropriate to assist
the Commission in the proper administration of this chapter. The Commission
may prescribe the manner and form in which such reports shall be made, and
require from such natural-gas companies specific answers to all questions upon
which the Commission may need information. The Commission may require that
such reports shall include, among other things, full information as to . . . trans-
portation, delivery, use, and sale of natural gas."
68. See note 59 supra.
69. See 1st note 61 supra and accompanying text.
70. It is submitted in the dissenting opinion, United Gas Pipe Line Co.,
Docket No. CP62-171 (Aug. 26, 1963) that these costs would be deter-
mined if the Commission were faced with a rate issue: "[T]he Federal Power
Commission in prescribing interstate rates follows definite allocation-of-costs
principles which insure that the interstate rates bear their fair share of system
costs and no more." Cited were American Louisiana Pipe Line Co., 48 P.U.R.3d
321 (1963); United Gas Pipe Line Co., 13 F.P.C. 398 (1954) ; and Atlantic
Seaboard Corp., 11 F.P.C. 43 (1952).
71. This determination is made by the FPC on its own judgment, independent
from allegations from pipelines and state commissions. See United Gas Pipe Line
Co., Docket No. CP62-161 (Aug. 26, 1963) (dissenting opinion).
72. See note 59 supra and accompanying text.
73. See colloquy of Senate debate of H.R. 6586, notes 50 and 66 supra.
The court of appeals in Lo-Vaca appears to have acted consistently with the
purpose of the act as gleaned from the legislative history.
74. Other considerations not given textual treatment that were mentioned in
[Vol. XXIV
COMMENTS
That a jurisprudential shift in the commingling cases has
occurred, greatly widening the ambit of "in interstate com-
merce," and thus the jurisdiction of the FPC, seems evident.
The Commission's trend is toward a federal scheme of regula-
tion with little regard given the wealth of legislative history
preceding the Natural Gas Act, jurisprudential interpretations
of "in interstate commerce" or the clearly restricted definition
of "in interstate commerce." If such broad interpretations of
this clause continue and gain judicial acceptance, it is believed
it will have become a mere label for disguising what the Com-
mission considers advantages flowing from federal regulation.
Federal regulation could be avoided only by new pipeline con-
struction wholly within states. The Commission's good faith in
exerting its power for what it deems a reasonable federal
scheme of regulation is not questioned; but in the words of Fed-
eral Power Commissioner Woodward:
"'. . . Congress ... provides laws, of which the Natural Gas
Act is an example, designed to reconcile diverse and con-
flicting interests in our nation and society in the interest of
the whole people. It is essential to the attainment of the
objectives of such legislation that the commands of Con-
gress, and the courts' interpretations thereof, be vigorously
obeyed.' "'7
He concludes the desire for achievement should not be allowed
to upset the preservation of our constitutional system by the as-
sertion of authority or exertion of functions "which a prepon-
derance of the guiding considerations shows are not ours. 1 6
The Lo-Vaca reversal suggests state regulation will prevail;
but the recent FPC decisions, evidencing a strong will to exer-
cise federal control, provide grounds for concern whether ex-
panded findings of "in interstate commerce" will continue and
the United opinion appear in 2d at note 61 supra. The Lo-Vaca opinion fur-
ther stated: "It would be possible, as in this case, for a pipeline to offer to
purchase gas at a higher price than we would otherwise allow in the area upon
the assertion that it would use this gas in its compressors or would deliver it to
its intrastate customers even though the gas would actually be received into its
general system transportation facilities and used for every system purpose."
40 P.U.R.3d 257, 266 (1961). About this the Commission says its regulation of
rates would be handicapped, but it is suggested there exists no jurisdiction to
regulate such rates as they are not wholesale rates if the gas is used solely by
El Paso whether in or out of the State of Texas. 52 Stat. 821 (1938), 15 U.S.C.
§ 717(b) (1958) ; City of Hastings v. FPC, 221 F.2d 31 (D.C. Cir. 1955).





become judicially accepted, and whether new jurisdictional tests
of "in interstate commerce" lying outside the act's definition
will emerge. If so, the FPC will have jurisdiction to the exclu-
sion of state authorities without the necessity of finding bur-
dens on interstate commerce in each case. Such a course
would seem to suppress knowledge of the effects of industry
practices and rate making upon producers, carriers, and con-
sumers alike, and render litigation in this area less curative,
causing proponents and opponents of federal or state power to
suffer undisclosed inefficiencies, the ascertainment of which, it
is submitted, would be welcomed by all.
David S. Bell*
MINERAL LEASE CANCELLATION FOR FAILURE TO
PAY PRODUCTION ROYALTY
INTRODUCTION
Recent decisions of the Second Circuit in Bailey v. Meadows'
and of the Third in Pierce v. Atlantic Refining Co. 2 cancelling
mineral leases because of the lessee's failure to commence pay-
ment of production royalty have caused great concern in the
Louisiana oil and gas industry. This comment will undertake
both a conceptual and practical analysis of this problem.
BACKGROUND
The mineral lease is the instrument used most frequently in
the commercial development of Louisiana's oil and gas resources.
No special body of legislation governs this unique type of con-
tract. Consequently, development of the law in this field has
been left largely to the courts, which have analogically applied
the Civil Code articles on predial leases to the mineral lease.s
In addition to the general requirements that a valid contract
*Writer worked as research assistant to Special Counsel for the Louisiana
Public Service Commission in preparation of an application for rehearing of
United Gas Pipe Line Co., Docket No. CP62-161 (Aug. 26, 1963).
1. 130 So. 2d 501 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1961), writs denied.
2. 140 So. 2d 19 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962), writs denied.
3. Melancon v. Texas Co., 230 La. 593, 89 So. 2d 135 (1956) ; Milling v. Col-
lector of Revenue, 220 La. 773, 57 So. 2d 679 (1952) ; Coyle v. North American
Oil Consol., 201 La. 99, 9 So. 2d 473 (1942) ; Tyson v. Surf Oil Co., 195 La.
248, 196 So. 336 (1940).
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